

18 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT : Revision of Current Intelligence Daily
Reporting Structure

1. You have asked us to review the distribution of the Central Intelligence Bulletin to see whether its circulation can be reduced to a level commensurate with the President's desire for restricted handling of sensitive information. The Bulletin has become so much of an institution that any radical changes in its distribution require re-examination of the whole current intelligence reporting mechanism. This memorandum presents our re-examination. It discusses present structure and dissemination, relations with DIA, the problem of coordination, and our recommendations for a package of changes which would meet many of these problems.

Present Current Intelligence Daily Publications

2. Short of the Checklist, which is not involved in the problem at hand, the Central Intelligence Bulletin is the community's prime vehicle for daily intelligence reporting. The Bulletin is produced by OCI under a procedure endorsed by USIB, which provides for systematic consultation with the other intelligence agencies but reserves to the DCI the final authority on substantive content. Material which has not been coordinated with other agencies is so designated; the agencies also have the right to a published dissent.

3. The Bulletin was designed to fulfill the DCI's responsibilities under NSCID 3, as revised in 1957, which states that "Normally, the current intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President and the National Security Council". Following its establishment, daily intelligence publications of other departments were gradually discontinued. This meant there was no duplication in this field until the DIA established a current intelligence publication in 1961. (See paras. 9-14)

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4. NSCID 3 goes on to say that CIA's current intelligence also "serves the common needs of the interested departments and agencies of the Government for current intelligence which they themselves do not produce." I believe that one of the problems of the present Bulletin is that in attempting to perform this function, as well as its primary function of serving the NSC level, it suffers from divided purpose.

5. The clash between these two functions is illustrated by the differences between the formal and the actual distribution lists for the Bulletin. The formal list (printed in the back of each issue) comprises 40 officials in Washington, including the White House group, the members of the NSC and JCS, a few other senior officials generally at the undersecretary level, and the USIB principals. In contrast to this relatively restricted list, our actual external distribution comes to 172 copies. Of these, 132 copies go to the Department of Defense, which has 20 named recipients on the formal list. The Department of State, with 6 named recipients, gets 14. Defense furnishes the Bulletin to policy officials below the originally prescribed level and circulates a number of copies in its various intelligence agencies. The White House receives 13 copies for 4 named officials; Justice 4 for 2; Treasury 2 for 2; and AEC 1 for 1. In addition, our couriers hand-carry copies to Dr. Wiesner's office, Budget, NASA, and USIA, where there are a total of four named recipients and some 17 readers.

6. Further extension of the Bulletin's wide circulation is made by wire. In addition to CINCPAC, CINCEUR, and CINCLANT (who are on the formal list), Defense sends it to a large number of lower level commands. We have a record of 35 such addressees and are reasonably sure that some of these commands then disseminate it further to their subcommands. To our knowledge, State does not send the Bulletin by wire. I would emphasize that once the Bulletin is put on the wire we lose all control over it.

7. With 172 hard copies outside CIA, another 175 inside, and at least 46 wire addressees [redacted] any item put in the Bulletin is exposed at a minimum estimate to the eyes of some 2,000 people. The actual total may be much higher. For this reason, I feel hesitant in allowing highly sensitive material to appear in the Bulletin. I am certain that the agencies which supply us sensitive information would be most uneasy if they knew the full extent of its dissemination.

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8. OCI also publishes the Current Intelligence Digest, a secret-level publication of broad circulation

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Relations with DIA

9. When DIA's proposals for setting up a current intelligence shop first became known, we were convinced that DIA planned to put itself in competition with us and that this would be a return to the duplication which the President's Board had successfully eliminated. It is now clear that DIA is following this course.

10. NSCID 3 authorizes the production by USIB agencies of any departmental intelligence for which their parent departments feel a need. Prior to the establishment of DIA, there was an unfilled need within the Defense Department for detailed current intelligence on military subjects of the kind which is too specialized for our publications and which we do not have the manpower to produce. We believe that there is a legitimate requirement for departmental intelligence. Through this loophole DIA has driven a truck.

11. DIA publishes two dailies, the top secret CODEWORD Summary and the secret Bulletin. Neither is coordinated, although there is occasionally some informal discussion between DIA's analysts and ours. The content of these publications follows roughly the same pattern as that of our Bulletin and Digest, with perhaps some additional emphasis on military aspects. We do not know what distribution to high-level readers outside the Defense Department is given to the DIA Summary. A copy is delivered to General Clifton every morning by a DIA briefing officer who appears at the White House at the time we deliver the Checklist; Clifton very occasionally will pull an item out to show the President when it contains more detail than the Checklist on a subject in which he knows the President has a special interest. DIA also gives its publications an extremely broad wire dissemination. The list includes all those headquarters which receive our Bulletin by wire and a number of others as well.

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12. DIA's view of its Summary as being in competition with the Central Intelligence Bulletin shows up in various ways.

a. The Summary virtually duplicates the coverage of our Bulletin, with only slightly less emphasis on political and economic subjects.

b. DIA insists with some jealousy on its right to publish any sensitive material in its Summary which we publish in the Bulletin. This means that no matter how much we reduce the circulation of the Bulletin in order to protect sensitive information within it, this information will be given a wide dissemination by DIA.

c. DIA views itself as the final authority on military matters and, as a matter of policy, resists any effort by CIA to speak independently in this field. Because we have a requirement placed on us to coordinate the Bulletin with DIA (see paras. 15-20 below), but DIA is not required to coordinate its Summary with us, DIA has an advantage which it sometimes tries to use to delay publication of military items in the Bulletin until its slower and less responsive apparatus is able to speak on the subject at hand. We do not let DIA get away with this when we sense that this is the real reason for its objection to our publication of an item.

13. DIA has been in the current intelligence business for a little more than a year. Although its output will undoubtedly improve, I do not believe DIA will ever be in a position to do as good a job as we do. DIA is a military agency, with almost all responsible positions held by officers of limited intelligence experience and on short term assignments. We have not yet reached the standards I would like us to, but we have personnel DIA cannot match. If I am correct, then it is unnecessary and duplicatory for DIA to compete with us for high level readership.

14. You will see from this discussion that we are faced with a situation in which we cannot make the improvements we think are necessary in the Bulletin without making some change in our relations with DIA and in DIA's own activities in the current intelligence field. What is needed is a decision by the Department of Defense that DIA's current operations be confined to the production of departmental current intelligence in accordance with NSCID 3, with the intent of the President's Board, and with the President's own wishes on control of sensitive information. Such a decision would automatically make the DIA Summary more specialized in content and would make it possible for us to reserve all intelligence of great sensitivity for a high-level audience.

Coordination

15. Only State/INR and DIA now participate in coordination of the Bulletin. At the regular afternoon meeting, State has been represented by a relatively junior officer at the GS-12 level and DIA by a major or lieutenant-colonel. Neither representative has any particular substantive background or enough rank to be permitted to speak for his agency or negotiate changes. He acts as a transmission belt only, with substantive negotiation conducted either at a higher or at a lower, analyst-to-analyst, level.

16. The meetings themselves are therefore pro forma and most items are approved without substantive change. State will occasionally have a valid objection to a political item. We have noticed some tendency on State's part to haggle over questions of style and to be over-sensitive on procedural questions in the coordination process.

17. DIA will agree only with great reluctance to the publication of a military item before it is able to publish on the same subject itself. This is especially true of anything dealing with advanced weaponry. As a consequence, my military analysts prefer to go through a tortuous process of clearing an item in advance with all the service agencies and CIA organizations concerned before submitting an item for the Bulletin. This sometimes causes a delay of several days.

18. The coordination process also results in some watering-down of the product. We do everything we can to keep a sharp edge but some blurring is unavoidable. I do not consider these delays and compromises to be serious handicaps under present circumstances because we retain the right to print what we think is right and let other agencies take footnotes. Also, we accept delays only if the subject is such that a delay will not cause serious loss of value of the item and if the item can be substantially improved by further consultation. We always have to weigh the time factor against the desirability of having the most authoritative statement possible.

19. While the requirement for coordination has not seriously hurt us, it has not helped us either. It was established to meet the needs of the previous Administration, which placed great emphasis on agreed papers. The Bulletin has since established itself as an essential tool of the policy-maker. I do not believe its reputation is founded on the fact that it is coordinated. Instead, it rests on the steadily growing competence and soundness of the analysts who write for it. Also, this Administration places a lower value on coordinated papers than did its predecessor.

20. I therefore believe the time has come to consider dropping the formal coordination process. The Bulletin, now and in the transformation I am about to propose, is strong enough to stand on its own feet without any increase in authority which is supposedly given it by coordination. It is true that immediate gains in content and timeliness from dropping coordination would be small on most occasions but it would provide freedom of independent action under all circumstances. I am also thinking of the future, when a new leadership of INR or DIA might use the existing machinery to hamper our production.

Recommendations

21. I propose to rationalize our current publication structure so that it will both meet the problems I have outlined and fit our present functions and capabilities. Each publication would be more clearly aimed at a definite audience and would have its circulation adjusted accordingly.

a. The Checklist would remain as it is.

b. We would create a new publication, tentatively called the Director of Central Intelligence Brief, which would replace the Bulletin as our vehicle for reaching NSC-level consumers, about 30 recipients (see Annex A for possible lists). It would be similar to the present Bulletin in format and in substantive content, but would include certain categories of material now too sensitive for the Bulletin. Its external circulation would be held firmly to the agreed list of recipients and there would be no wire dissemination. We would also restrict its internal dissemination.

c. The present Bulletin and Digest would be combined and reorganized into a Central Intelligence Bulletin (CODEWORD) and Central Intelligence Bulletin (Secret). The two would be similar to the present Bulletin in format but of a slightly lower level of substantive content, as certain categories of material now used--with sanitization-- in the Bulletin will be reserved to the DCI Brief. (The secret version will contain sanitized treatment of important COMINT items). Both versions would be issued to a distribution list somewhere between that now given the Bulletin and that now given the Digest.

d. Both versions of the Bulletin will also be issued by wire, for the use of any Ambassador, Chief of Station or senior military commander. In fact, we would hope to offer these cables as an additional service to overseas installations which do not now receive the Bulletin. The cables would also be used to provide DIA with political and economic intelligence for use in its own publications. (See paras. 9-14).

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22. With this structure, we would carry out the first function of NSCID 3 by issuing the Checklist, designed personally for the President, and the DCI Brief, designed for his policy advisors. The second function of NSCID 3 would be met by a less sensitive publication, issued in a variety of forms and classifications and given a broad dissemination. I would propose that none of these publications be coordinated.

23. Through the new Bulletin we could support DIA in current intelligence. While we have no grounds for seeking to eliminate production of economic and political departmental intelligence in Defense, much of the present duplication could be eliminated by our supplying DIA with current intelligence. DIA could then disseminate such material as it chooses, along with its own military output, to any appropriate consumers within the military structure.

Recommendations for Implementation

24. Contingent upon your approval of these proposals for a new highly restricted publication and a realignment of our present ones, for abandoning the coordination process, and for rearranging our relations with DIA on this basis, I would recommend the following sequence of steps.

a. That these proposals be presented to the President's Board and its approval obtained.

b. That you discuss the problem with Mr. McNamara and obtain his agreement to a redefinition of roles in the production of current intelligence.

c. That you negotiate with General Carroll an agreement along the lines suggested above.

d. That the agreed package be presented to the USIB for formal approval.

e. That you offer to Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara and authorize the DD/I to offer to the DD/P the cable service to field stations envisaged in Paragraph 10.

f. That you authorize me to make the necessary adjustments in organization and procedures and put the new system into effect.

25. Our proposals should emphasize the positive advantages to be gained from acceptance of our package.

- a. A better publication for high-level readers.
- b. Tighter control for sensitive materials.
- c. Better and more timely service to "upper-middle" officials at home and abroad.
- d. Budgetary savings through elimination of duplication.



R. J. SMITH
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence

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2 Enclosures
Annexes (A&B)

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ANNEX A

The following are alternate distribution lists for the "DCI Brief":

a. The minimum list -- 14.

The President
The Vice President
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Rusk
Mr. Ball
Mr. McGhee
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Rostow
Mr. Robert Kennedy
Mr. Dillon
Mr. McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. Nitze

b. The minimum expanded to include all the Executive Committee of the NSC -- 16.

Mr. Sorenson
Mr. Thompson

c. Expansion to include other White House Staff members (this is probably inevitable) -- 22.

Mr. Heller
General Clifton
Mr. Kaysen
Mr. Bromley Smith
Mr. Parrott
Mr. Coyne

d. Expansion to include members of the JCS, the service secretaries, and the senior members of USIB -- 31.

General Wheeler
Admiral Anderson
General Lemay
General Shoup
Mr. Vance
Mr. Korth
Mr. Zuckert
General Carroll
Mr. Hilsman

e. Expansion to include all members of USIB and their principals -- 40.

Mr. Hoover
Dr. Seaborg
General Fitch
Admiral Lowrance
General Breitweiser
General Blake
General Collins
Mr. Traynor
Mr. Belmont

f. Additional possibilities -- 4.

Dr. Wiesner
Mr. Webb
Mr. Bell
Mr. Murrow

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